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Criminal Constitutional Law-AN ATrACK ON FOURTH AMENDMENT
PROTECTION: SECURITY GUARDS AND THE "PRIVATE" SEARCH Doc-
TRINE-State v. Buswell, 460 N.W.2d 614 (Minn. 1990), reh'g denied,
(Minn. Oct. 8, 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1107 (1991).
I. INTRODUCTION
The Minnesota Supreme Court recently considered whether
searches and seizures by a private security guard invoked Fourth
Amendment protection. The supreme court, in State v. Buswell, I rein-
stated a trial court's ruling that a security guard's searches failed to
constitute government action.2 The supreme court's employment of
the private search doctrine, which limits Fourth Amendment protec-
tion to government action, barred application of the exclusionary
rule.3 Consequently, evidence seized by the guard and later deliv-
ered to law enforcement officials secured convictions against the
defendants .4
In determining whether government participation transformed the
security guard's searches into government action, the supreme court
erroneously concluded that the searches occurred without govern-
ment knowledge or acquiescence and promoted private interests. 5
The Buswell decision undermines Fourth Amendment guarantees
and further exposes individual security to an increased threat posed
by the private security industry.
II. BACKGROUND
A. The Fourth Amendment and the Exclusionary Rule
The Fourth Amendment, as drafted and currently interpreted,
prohibits unreasonable searches and seizures.6 The amendment
1. 460 N.W.2d 614 (Minn. 1990), reh'g denied, (Minn. Oct. 8, 1990), cert. denied,
111 S. Ct. 1107 (1991).
2. Id. at 620-21.
3. See infra notes 9-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of the applica-
tion and practical effect of the exclusionary rule.
4. Buswell, 460 N.W.2d at 617.
5. Id. at 620-21.
6. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. The amendment reads as follows:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects, against all unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the per-
sons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
American colonists drafted the Fourth Amendment in response to their abhor-
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guards an individual's security against violations of both person and
property. 7 The amendment's terms neither restrict its operation to
government intrusions nor require that evidence obtained by a viola-
tion be excluded from criminal trials.8
To enforce the Fourth Amendment and defend individual security,
the United States Supreme Court fashioned the exclusionary rule.9
The rule demands exclusion of illegally obtained evidence from
criminal proceedings in both federal and state courts.' 0 Originally,
the exclusionary rule served to uphold judicial integrity and constitu-
tional mandates."l Recent Supreme Court decisions, however, char-
acterize its function as a deterrent to police misconduct.12
Although Supreme Court decisions eventually applied the Fourth
rence for the constant privacy invasions resulting from the routine issuance of writs
of assistance. Although writs of assistance were used primarily to combat smuggling,
they served as general search warrants, thus conferring additional powers upon con-
stables. See 1 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE § 1.1(a) (1987). See also Adams
v. New York, 192 U.S. 585, 598 (1904) (stating that Fourth Amendment is "designed
to prevent violations of private security in person and property").
7. Adams, 192 U.S. at 598.
8. See supra note 6.
9. See, e.g., Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914). The exclusionary rule
prohibits the introduction at trial of evidence seized by the government in violation
of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 398. The Court stated that if the government could
use such evidence, the Fourth Amendment "might as well be stricken from the Con-
stitution." Id. at 393. See also Kim A. Lambert, Note, United States v. Jacobsen: Ex-
panding Private Search Doctrine Undermining Fourth Amendment Values, 16 Loy. U. CHI. L.J.
359, 367 (1985).
10. A dual standard between state and federal prosecutions survived until the
Supreme Court extended the rule to state prosecutions in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961). In Mapp, the Court declared the exclusionary rule an "essential part of
both the Fourth and Fourteenth Amendments .... Id. at 657. For historical per-
spective, see Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 248 (1833) (applying Bill of
Rights only to the federal government).
Minnesota's exclusionary rule is codified at MINN. STAT. § 626.21 (1990).
11. See, e.g., Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206, 223 (1960) (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting; citing McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332, 345 (1942), for the propo-
sition that courts become accomplices to disobedience of the Constitution if govern-
ment officials are allowed to secure convictions of private persons through illegal
activity); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 398 (1914) (upholding a conviction
based on illegally obtained evidence contradicts constitutional guarantees). Lam-
bert, supra note 9, at 367.
12. See Michigan v. DeFillippo, 443 U.S. 31, 38 n.3 (1979) ("purpose of the ex-
clusionary rule is to deter unlawful police action"); United States v. Calandra, 414
U.S. 338, 347 (1974) (stating that rule's primary purpose is to deter future unlawful
police conduct and thereby effectuate the Fourth Amendment); Terry v. Ohio, 392
U.S. 1, 12 (1968) (stating that major thrust of exclusionary rule is deterrence of law-
less police conduct). See also Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 391-93 (1914)
(stating that illegally obtained evidence must be inadmissible).
[Vol. 18
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Amendment to the states, 13 most state constitutions already con-
tained similar provisions.14 These state constitutional prohibitions
either adopt the amendment's terms verbatim or with superficial var-
iations.'5 The Minnesota Constitution, ratified in 1857, provides
protection virtually identical to that of the Fourth Amendment.' 6
B. Historical Development of the Private Search Doctrine
Although its terms express no such limitation,'7 the Fourth
Amendment protects individuals only from government conduct.' 8
The requirement of government action derives solely from judicial
interpretation.19 Unlike the exclusionary rule, the requirement of
government action has received limited judicial scrutiny as to its ap-
plication and purpose.20
Commonly referred to as the "private search doctrine," the re-
quirement of government intrusion eliminates Fourth Amendment
analysis as to private conduct.2  The Fourth Amendment provides
13. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (applying the Fourth Amendment to
the states through the Fourteenth Amendment).
14. See Connell L. Archey, Comment, The Status of Private Searches Under the Louisi-
ana Constitution of 1974, 49 LA. L. REV. 873, 884-85 (1989).
15. "Many state courts simply cite Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921), as
conclusive authority for the proposition that state constitutional provisions gov-
erning search and seizure apply only to government actors." Buswell, 460 N.W.2d at
886. See Archey, supra note 14 at 884-85 (discussing adoption of the Fourth Amend-
ment in different jurisdictions).
16. See MINN. CONST. art. I, § 10. A search and seizure provision identical to the
Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution first appeared in Article I, Sec-
tion 10 of the Minnesota Constitution of 1857. The Minnesota Supreme Court spe-
cifically noted "that Art. I, § 10 of the Minnesota Constitution, like its federal
counterpart, the Fourth Amendment, purports to constrain only unreasonable
searches by governmental authority." State v. Buswell, 460 N.W.2d 616, 618 n.3
(Minn. 1990), reh'g denied, (Minn. Oct. 8, 1990), cert denied, I IIS. Ct. 1107 (1991).
17. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
18. See 1 LAFAvE, supra note 6, § 1.1(a).
19. See Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921). According to the Supreme
Court,
[t]he Fourth Amendment gives protection against unlawful searches and
seizures, and as shown in the previous cases, its protection applies to gov-
ernmental action. Its origin and history clearly show that it was intended as a
restraint upon the activities of sovereign authority, and was not intended to
be a limitation upon other than governmental agencies ....
Id. at 475. See also Annotation, Admissibility in Criminal Cases of Evidence Obtained by
Searches by Private Individuals, 36 A.L.R.3D 553, 557 (1971).
20. See Annotation, supra note 19, at 557.
21. See generally, Brian J. Serr, Great Expectations of Privacy: A New Model for Fourth
Amendment Protection, 73 MINN. L. REV. 583, 627-32 (1989) (examining the private
party search doctrine and its implications for warrantless government searches of
items knowingly exposed to the public); David L. DeNinno, Note, Private Searches and
Seizures: An Application of the Public Function Theory, 48 GEo. WASH. L. REv. 433 (1980)
(applying the public function theory to find state action in private searches); Lam-
1992]
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no protection against unreasonable searches and seizures conducted
by private parties. 22 This exemption of private searches stems from
both the amendment's historical development as well as the purpose
of the exclusionary rule. 23 The suppression of evidence discovered
by a private party fails to advance the Fourth Amendment's currently
recognized purpose: regulation of police activity.24
C. Recent Interpretation of the Private Search Doctrine
Although no constitutional violations result from "private"
searches, the mere fact that a search is conducted by a private party
does not automatically exempt it from Fourth Amendment scru-
tiny.25 The Fourth Amendment applies only if the private party ac-
ted as an instrument or agent of the state.26 Whether a private
search is transformed into government action is a factual determina-
tion which belongs to the trial court. 27 To make this determination,
federal and state courts employ one of two tests: the critical factors
test or the government instigation test.2
8
The first test, formulated in United States v. Walther,29 stresses two
bert, supra note 9 (discussing the expansion of the private search doctrine to allow
warrantless government searches following private searches).
22. See Burdeau, 256 U.S. at 475. Civil and criminal actions are available to sub-
jects of illegal searches and seizures conducted by private citizens. See 1 LAFAVE,
supra note 6, § 1.8(a), at 176.
23. See supra notes 11-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of the exclu-
sionary rule's purpose.
24. Lambert, supra note 8, at 369. See, e.g., Michael Wukmer, Comment, The
Fourth Amendment Following Private Searches: Is There a Privacy Interest to Protect?, 52 U.
CIN. L. REV. 172, 176 n.30 (1983) (citing 1 LAFAVE, supra note 6, § 1.6 (1978) (stating
that deterrence of neither private parties nor government officials results from the
exclusion of evidence where search motive relates to other than criminal
convictions)).
25. See, e.g., United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 113 (1984) (holding no
Fourth Amendment violation resulted from invasion of defendant's package by pri-
vate carrier's agents solely because of their private character).
26. See Skinner v. Railway Execs Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602, 615-16 (1989) (reasoning
that because government removed legal barriers to employee drug testing and en-
couraged and participated in testing, Fourth Amendment is implicated); cf. Coolidge
v. New Hampshire, 403 U.S. 443, 487 (1971) (reasoning that because murder sus-
pect's wife did not act as instrument or agent of government when she voluntarily
provided police officers with incriminating evidence, Fourth Amendment is not
implicated).
27. State v. Buswell, 460 N.W.2d 614, 618 (Minn. 1990), reh'g denied, (Minn. Oct.
8, 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1107 (1991). This determination remains subject to a
clearly erroneous standard of ro:view. Id. at 618-19; see also United States v. Koenig,
856 F.2d 843, 849 (7th Cir. 1988) (holding that trial court's finding that private mail
carrier examined packages for its own reasons was not clearly erroneous).
28. See infra notes 32-33 and accompanying text (discussing the adoption of the
private search doctrine by individual states).
29. 652 F.2d 788 (9th Cir. 1981). Other federal circuit courts also apply this test.
[Vol. 18
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critical factors: government knowledge and acquiescence and the in-
tent of the party performing the search.3 0 The second test examines
the degree of government instigation.3' These tests, while limited in
precedential value,3 2 help trial courts focus on the significance of the
government's share of the intrusion.33
III. THE BUSWELL DECISION
A. The Facts
In 1988, Brainerd International Raceway (BIR)34 contracted with
North Country Security35 for private security services on race week-
ends.36 North Country's responsibilities included ensuring that only
ticket holders entered the raceway grounds.3 7 It discharged this duty
See, e.g., United States v. Pierce, 893 F.2d 669, 673 (holding that airline employees
failed to demonstrate intent to assist law enforcement efforts when they opened "sus-
picious" package which contained drugs), reh'g denied. 897 F.2d 528 (5th Cir. 1990);
Pleasant v. Lovell, 876 F.2d 787, 798 (10th Cir. 1989) (holding that IRS special
agents knew of and acquiesced in the conduct of private actor who provided them
documents for investigative purposes); United States v. Feffer, 831 F.2d 734, 739
(7th Cir. 1987) (actor's seizure of company documents for IRS agents failed to
demonstrate intent to assist law enforcement officials).
30. Walther, 652 F.2d at 792.
31. See United States v. Luciow, 518 F.2d 298, 300 (8th Cir. 1975) (holding that
some degree of government instigation is required to transform a private individual's
search into governmental action). See also United States v. Coleman, 628 F.2d 961,
965 (6th Cir. 1980) (holding that police did not instigate, encourage or participate in
search of truck containing marijuana).
32. The Minnesota Supreme Court acknowledged that "[t]he diversity in factual
settings involving private searches mandates an individual, case-by-case analysis in
which precedent plays but a small part." Buswell, 460 N.W.2d at 618.
33. Id. at 617-18. The Minnesota Supreme Court employed the private search
doctrine on at least two prior occasions. See State v. Kumpula, 355 N.W.2d 697, 701
(Minn. 1984) (holding that police officer's entry into defendant's apartment accom-
panied by caretaker was reasonable, but search of personal papers was not); State v.
Hodges, 287 N.W.2d 413, 416 (Minn. 1979) (holding Fourth Amendment protection
did not extend to warrantless entry into defendant's warehouse, although landlord
consented).
34. Brainerd International Raceway operates a racetrack on private property in
Crow Wing County, approximately six miles outside the city of Brainerd, Minnesota.
The raceway lies outside the city's jurisdiction with respect to police protection. Bus-
well, 460 N.W.2d at 615.
35. Id. Keith Emerson, a member of the Brainerd police force, owned and oper-
ated North Country Security. All Brainerd police officers, Emerson included, held
appointments as special deputies for Crow Wing County. However, no Brainerd po-
lice officer carried an independent power of arrest outside the city limits. Id.
36. Id. In return for payment of a set amount, North Country hired guards and
managed all security arrangements at the track. Id. at 616.
37. Id. BIR also requested that North Country prevent illegal drugs and other
contraband from entering the premises. Id. The Minnesota Supreme Court sup-
ported BIR's efforts stating:
Crowd and patron conduct is difficult to control during a race of this magni-
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by randomly stopping and searching vehicles which sought entry.38
On August 18, 1988, North Country3 9 searched vehicles occupied by
Jeffrey Buswell, Gary Schwartzman, and Dale Schmidt.40
After entrance gates were opened, a North Country security
guard4' stopped and searched the defendants' vehicles. 42 Contrary
to company policy,4 3 the guard neglected to obtain the defendants'
consent or inform them of the option to refuse and exit the prem-
ises.44 The guard searched extensively 45 and uncovered drugs and
drug paraphernalia.46 Upon discovery of the contraband, the armed
security guard47 handcuffed the defendants to a nearby fence and
notified his supervisor.48 North Country, pursuant to previously es-
tablished protocol,49 summoned local law enforcement officials who
tude, involving tens of thousands of patrons and extending over several
days. In authorizing searches for illegal drugs, mopeds and fireworks, BIR
hoped to minimize incidents that might result in damage to patrons or
property.
Id. at 616 n.l. The court referred to Rieger v. Zackoski, 321 N.W.2d 16 (Minn.
1982), in which BIR was sued in a personal injury action where the plaintiff was
struck by an unauthorized vehicle on the racetrack.
38. Buswell, 460 N.W.2d at 616. Approximately 78,000 persons attended the
raceway between Thursday and Sunday that weekend. Id. In this writer's opinion,
large crowds made mandatory vehicle searches unrealistic.
39. North Country employed 127 security guards for the weekend of August 18,
1988. Though six or seven licensed police officers were in the group, none policed
jurisdictions which included BIR. Id.
40. Id. at 616-17. The three defendants' cases were joined at trial. Defendant
Schmidt drove a borrowed pick-up camper. Defendants Buswell and Schwartzman
drove a converted Greyhound bus. Id. at 617.
41. Bruce Gateley, a private security guard employed by North Country,
searched the defendants' vehicles. Gateley was not licensed or employed as a law
enforcement officer in any jurisdiction. Id. at 616.
42. Id.
43. Id. at 616. Racegoers received no written warning of impending searches.
However, North Country's policy required employees to secure consent and inform
patrons of the option to decline and leave the raceway grounds. Id.
44. Id. Security guard Gateley merely informed the defendants of the reason for
the searches. Id. at 617.
45. Id. Gateley entered the pick-up camper and opened a closet which contained
a fishing tackle box. Id. Gateley opened the box and examined its contents. Id. at
617 n.2. He also boarded the converted bus and searched through closets. Id. at
617.
46. Id. at 616. The guard found cocaine in both vehicles. Id.
47. Gateley wore a North Country Security guard uniform which came complete
with handcuffs and sidearm. Id.
48. Id. at 617. Gateley's supervisor, Keith Emerson, was also the owner of North
Country Security. See supra note 35.
49. Buswell, 460 N.W.2d at 616. Emerson conferred in general terms with the
Crow Wing County Sheriff and the local Minnesota Bureau of Criminal Apprehen-
sion prior to the 1988 racing season regarding arrest procedures at BIR. The parties
reached an agreement that Emerson would receive immediate notification of any inci-
dent encountered by North Country personnel which appeared to warrant an arrest.
[Vol. 18
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arrested the defendants after further investigation.50
The trial court denied the defendants' motion to suppress the evi-
dence seized by the security guard and found them guilty of posses-
sion of controlled substances.5l The court held that the security
guard's searches failed to constitute government action so as to trig-
ger the Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule.52 The court of ap-
peals reversed and remanded.53 The Minnesota Supreme Court
reversed the court of appeals and reinstated the trial court's
judgment.54
B. The Court's Analysis
The court in Buswell based its decision on the established principle
that the Fourth Amendment proscribes only government action.S5
The court stated that, if the searches had been conducted by govern-
ment officials, they would have been unconstitutional.56 However,
the court held that the private security guard's searches failed to con-
stitute government action.57 Consequently, drugs seized by the
guard and later delivered to law enforcement officials secured con-
victions against the defendants.58 In determining whether govern-
ment participation recasted the private security guard as an agent of
the state, the court applied the critical factors test employed in United
They also agreed that a sheriff's deputy would remain "on call" to accommodate any
requests for assistance. Id.
50. Id. at 617. A subsequent custodial search of defendants Buswell and
Schwartzman revealed more cocaine on their persons. State v. Buswell, 449 N.W.2d
471, 472 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), rev'd, 460 N.W.2d 614 (Minn. 1990), reh'g denied,
(Minn. Oct. 8, 1990), cert. denied, I1 S. Ct. 1107 (1991).
51. Buswell, 449 N.W.2d at 471-72. Defendants violated MINN. STAT. § 152.09,
subd. 1 (2) (1989) (repealed August 1, 1989) and MINN. STAT. § 152.15, subd. 2 (2)
(1988) (repealed August 1, 1989). For current Minnesota statutory law as to the pos-
session of controlled substances, see MINN. STAT., ch. 152 (Supp. 1991).
52. State v. Buswell, 460 N.W.2d 614 (Minn. 1990), reh'g denied, (Minn. Oct. 8,
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1107 (1991).
53. State v. Buswell, 449 N.W.2d 471 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989) rev'd, 460 N.W.2d
614 (Minn. 1990), reh'g denied, (Minn. Oct. 8, 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1107
(1991).
54. Buswell, 460 N.W.2d at 620-21.
55. Id. at 617. Directly citing Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465 (1921), the
court stated the Fourth Amendment was not intended to limit private conduct. Id.
See supra note 15.
56. Buswell, 460 N.W.2d at 617. The court stated, "[wie have not the slightest
doubt that these searches, which can charitably be characterized as being 'outra-
geous,' would violate the Fourth Amendment and result in suppression had they
been made by one exercising governmental action." Id.
57. Id. at 620.
58. Id. at 617. See supra notes 9-10 and accompanying text for a discussion of the
application and practical effect of the exclusionary rule.
1992]
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States v. Walther.5 9
In discussing the first factor, the supreme court rejected the de-
fendants' contentions that the searches involved government knowl-
edge and acquiescence.60 Although it acknowledged that law
enforcement officials knew of North Country's plans to conduct
searches, the court found nothing indicating these officials knew of
or acquiesced in the specific searches performed by the security
guard.61 The court ruled that the security guard conducted the
searches without government objectives in mind.
62
Analyzing the second factor, the underlying purpose of the
searches, the court again rejected the defendants' claims of govern-
ment entanglement. 63 The court stated BIR's interest in excluding
stowaways and contraband from the raceway grounds qualified as a
legitimate private purpose.64 Accordingly, the Minnesota Supreme
Court reinstated the trial court's finding that the security guard's
searches constituted private action outside Fourth Amendment
constraints. 65
IV. ANALYSIS OF THE BUSWELL DECISION
The Minnesota Supreme Court followed a line of precedent hold-
ing that the Fourth Amendment applies only to government con-
duct.66 The supreme court held that the security guard's searches
59. Buswell, 460 N.W.2d at 618-20. See text accompanying notes 26-33 for a dis-
cussion of the test developed in United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788 (9th Cir.
1981). The Buswell court also examined the degree of government instigation in the
search and concluded "that it was the race track management who requested vehicle
searches for nonpaying attenders, and for other items that might be used to disrupt
the raceway weekend program." Buswell, 460 N.W.2d at 620.
60. Id. at 619 (citing United States v. Walther, 652 F.2d 788, 792 (9th Cir.
1981)).
61. Buswell, 460 N.W.2d at 619. The court stated, "nothing in the record indi-
cates that law enforcement officials knew the searches would violate BIR policy and
be conducted without first obtaining the consent of the vehicle occupants." Id.
62. Id. The court noted that no government official persuaded North Country
personnel to conduct searches in any particular manner or for specific items. Id.
63. Id. at 620-21.
64. Id. at 620. The court stated:
The BIR primarily sought to prevent people from entering the raceway
without first paying admission. Additionally, the BIR had legitimate private
reasons to prevent illegal drugs, mopeds, and fireworks from entering the
raceway in order to minimize disruptive behavior of patrons, to prevent in-
jury to or discomfort of other patrons, and to reduce the possibility of de-
struction to property.
Id.
65. Id. at 620-21.
66. See generally Buswell, 460 N.W.2d 614. Citing the primary United States
Supreme Court cases which developed this legal principle, the court states, "we can-
not ignore the clear line of precedents starting with Burdeau v. McDowell which hold
[Vol. 18
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failed to constitute government action subject to Fourth Amendment
constraints. 67 In accordance with the critical factors test, the court
correctly examined the searches as to their degree of government
involvement and underlying purpose.68
The Buswell court erroneously concluded, however, that the
searches occurred without government knowledge or acquiescence
and promoted private interests.69 As evidenced by their conference
with North Country, local law enforcement officials undoubtedly
knew of and acquiesced in the company's plans to conduct searches
and detain individuals. 7o At that conference, the parties established
a procedure for contacting law enforcement officers upon the discov-
ery of contraband,7 1 and designated an officer to remain "on call" to
assist with potential arrests.72 Despite these uncontested facts, the
court found no government involvement in the security guard's
searches. 73
Similarly, the court incorrectly ruled that the searches were moti-
vated by private interests. The security guard's searches were specif-
ically designed to assist law enforcement officials secure criminal
convictions.7 4 BIR's interests demanded only that the defendants be
excluded from the raceway grounds. 75 The private security guard
assumed the public function 76 of law enforcement by directing the
that the fourth amendment only gives protection against unlawful government ac-
tions." Id. at 620, 621 n.6.
67. Id. at 620-21.
68. See supra notes 25-26 and accompanying text.
69. Private interests were promoted by preventing unpaid admissions, prevent-
ing illegal drugs, and minimizing disruptive behavior. Buswell, 460 N.W.2d at 620.
70. See supra note 49. See also Buswell, 460 N.W.2d at 621 (Yetka, J., dissenting)
(arguing that contact between North Country and local law enforcement clearly indi-
cates acquiescence to the searches); 1 LAFAVE, supra note 6, § 1.8(e) n.151; see also El
Fundi v. Deroche, 625 F.2d 195, 196 (8th Cir. 1980) (state action exists when private
security guards and police officers act in concert to deprive a plaintiff of civil rights).
71. Buswell, 460 N.W.2d at 621.
72. State v. Buswell, 449 N.W.2d 470, 474 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), revd, 460
N.W.2d 614 (Minn. 1990), reh'g denied, (Minn. Oct. 8, 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct.
1107 (1991).
73. The Buswell court improperly required a showing that local law enforcement
officials encouraged a particular manner or type of search. See also Buswell, 460
N.W.2d at 621 (YetkaJ., dissenting). The dissent discusses Skinner v. Railway Execs
Ass'n, 489 U.S. 602 (1989), and states, "[tihe Court did not require the defendants to
establish, as the majority suggests the defendants should here, that the government
encouraged a particular manner of or objectives for searching people .... " Buswell,
460 N.W.2d at 621.
74. Id. Although the dissent commends private citizens who assist law enforce-
ment personnel, it warns that their efforts must avoid violation of the Constitution.
Id. at 622 (Yetka, J., dissenting).
75. Buswell, 460 N.W.2d at 617. See supra note 37 and accompanying text for a
discussion of BIR's security interests.
76. See Buswell, 460 N.W.2d at 622 (Yetka, J., dissenting). The public function
1992]
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searches toward the discovery of contraband and subsequent public
prosecution.77 Nevertheless, the court failed to conclude that the
guard's searches constituted government action.78
The court's shortsighted decision creates three undesirable conse-
quences. First, the ruling fosters the idea that private security guards
possess broader authority to conduct searches than government offi-
cials. 79 The supreme court's willingness to advance this position de-
fies common sense. Ill-trained in the subtleties of search and seizure
law, security guards pose a much greater threat to individual
security.80
Second, the decision encourages reliance on private security per-
sonnel. If permitted to ignore Fourth Amendment proscriptions, se-
curity guards become an attractive alternative to public law
enforcement. Nothing prevents government officials from prosecut-
ing individuals with evidence obtained by private security guards.
This fact, coupled with the expanding use of security guards, creates
the untenable result of a corresponding rise in unreasonable
searches.81
Third, the court's decision diminishes Fourth Amendment protec-
tion. Although the Fourth Amendment provides no protection
strand of state action theory asserts that a private citizen becomes a government ac-
tor when that person "performs tasks and exercises powers that are traditionally gov-
ernmental in nature." Steven Euller, Private Security and the Exclusionary Rule, 15 HARV.
C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 649, 657 (1980). The doctrine continues to gain acceptance in
private security cases. Id. n.33. See generally DeNinno, supra note 21 (examining re-
cent private search cases in light of the Fourth Amendment).
The court of appeals in the instant case found that the role of North Country
Security guards constituted a police function. State v. Buswell, 449 N.W.2d 471, 474
(Minn. Ct. App. 1989) rev'd, 460 N.W.2d 615 (Minn. 1990), reh'g denied, (Minn. Oct. 8,
1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1107 (1991).
77. Id. at 616. Where such search motivations exist, a suppression of the evi-
dence discovered provides an effective deterrent to future misconduct. See supra
notes 11-12 and accompanying text for a discussion of the rationale behind limiting
application of the exclusionary rule to government searches and seizures. The force
of this rationale breaks down, however, in connection with cases involving searches
by private security officers who act for the very purpose of obtaining evidence of
crime. Annotation, supra note 19, at 558.
78. Buswell, 460 N.W.2d at 620-21.
79. Id. at 622 (Yetka, J., dissenting).
80. See, e.g., People v. Holloway, 267 N.W.2d 454, 459 (Mich. App. 1978) (Kauf-
man, J., concurring). The typical private security guard is a white male, poorly edu-
cated, inadequately trained, and poorly paid. JAMES S. KAKALIK & SORREL WILDHORN,
THE PRIVATE POLICE, 101-02 (1977) (a five-volume study of the private security in-
dustry conducted by the Rand Corporation).
81. United States v. Dansberry, 500 F. Supp. 140, 145 (N.D. Ill. 1980). The court
stated, "[i]f private security guards are permitted to ignore fourth amendment pro-
scriptions, reliance on private security personnel rather than law enforcement officers
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against unreasonable searches and seizures by private parties,82 pri-
vate security guards operate in a "gray area" which sits astride the
public-private distinction.83 The Buswell court erred on the side of a
restrictive interpretation of the Fourth Amendment, thus sanctioning
the opportunity for widespread abuse by private security person-
nel.8 4 The court's decision to classify the security guard's searches
as private action further relaxes constitutional strictures through ju-
dicial interpretation and supports an expanding government right to
violate individual security.85
V. CONCLUSION
The private security sector employs more people and expands at a
faster rate than public law enforcement.86 This growth represents an
increasing threat to individual security.87 Used as supplements to
police protection, private security personnel perform functions simi-
lar to licensed police officers.88 Though cognizant of the threat
posed by private security guards,8 9 the Buswell court nonetheless re-
82. The judicial exemption of private searches from Fourth Amendment scrutiny
applies in even the most egregious of circumstances. See, e.g., Burdeau v. McDowell,
256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921) (holding Fourth Amendment protection against unreasona-
ble search and seizure does not apply when private detective illegally blew open safe
to obtain evidence); United States v. McGuire, 381 F.2d 306 (2d Cir. 1967) (holding
recordings initially obtained through theft by a private citizen and later voluntarily
given to government were admissible), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1053 (1968); Geniviva v.
Bingler, 206 F. Supp. 81 (W.D. Pa. 1961) (holding evidence obtained from a burglary
was not excluded by the Fourth Amendment). See also supra note 19 and accompany-
ing text.
83. People v. Holloway, 267 N.W.2d 454, 459 (Mich. App. 1978).
84. Id.
85. State v. Buswell, 460 N.W.2d 615, 622 (Minn. 1990), reh'g denied, (Minn. Oct.
8, 1990), cert denied, 111 S. Ct. 1107 (1991) (Yetka, J., dissenting). The dissent ad-
vanced a "strict constructionist" approach in analyzing the protection afforded by the
Fourth Amendment. Justice Yetka stated, "I am concerned that the majority opinion,
in effect, waters down the Bill of Rights. The Bill of Rights should be changed by
amending the Constitution itself, not by judicial interpretation." Id.
86. People v. Zelinski, 594 P.2d 1000, 1005 (Cal. 1979) (quoting PRIVATE SECUR-
rrY ADV. COUN. TO U.S. DEvr. OF JUSTICE, REPORT ON THE REGULATION OF PRIVATE
SECURITY SERVICES 1 (1976)).
87. Zelinski, 594 P.2d at 1005. The California Supreme Court stated, "[w]e are
mindful, however, of the increasing reliance placed upon private security personnel
by local law enforcement authorities for the prevention of crime and enforcement of
the criminal law and the increasing threat to privacy rights posed thereby." Id.
88. State v. Buswell, 449 N.W.2d 471, 474 (Minn. Ct. App. 1989), rev'd, 460
N.W.2d 614 (Minn. 1990), reh'g denied, (Minn. Oct. 8, 1990), cert. denied, 111 S. Ct.
1107 (1991).
89. The court stated:
[W]e express our concern that egregious searches by private security guards
escape the penalty of suppression, whereas similar conduct by licensed law
enforcement officers would not. We take notice that private security guards
1992]
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instated the trial court's finding that the security guard's searches
failed to constitute government action subject to Fourth Amendment
constraints .90
The Minnesota Supreme Court correctly employed the critical fac-
tors test to determine whether government participation trans-
formed the security guard's searches into government action.91
However, the court erroneously held that the searches occurred
without government knowledge or acquiescence and promoted pri-
vate interests. Law enforcement officials knew of and acquiesced in
North Country's plans to conduct vehicle searches and detain peo-
ple.92 BIR's security interests required only the exclusion of
stowaways and contraband from the raceway grounds. 93 Its interests
were not furthered by the confiscation of contraband and subsequent
prosecution of its patrons. In holding that the security guard's
searches failed to constitute government action, the court has under-
mined the purpose of the Fourth Amendment and opened the door
to unbridled searches by private security personnel.94
Brian L. Williams
often possess professional police knowledge and skill, and may conduct
searches with the goal of obtaining evidence of crime. (citations omitted).
Buswell, 460 N.W.2d at 620 n.6.
90. Id. at 619.
91. Id. at 618-20. See also supra notes 27-31 and accompanying text.
92. Buswell, 460 N.W.2d at 616.
93. Id. at 616.
94. Recent changes in the composition of the Minnesota Supreme Court contrib-
ute to the uncertainty surrounding this issue. Justice Glenn Kelley, who wrote the
majority opinion in Buswell, retired from the bench the day the opinion was issued.
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